This paper studies the resource-allocation problem for a heterogeneous network (HetNet) in which the spectrum owned by a macrocell operator (MCO) can be shared by both unlicensed users (UUs) and licensed users (LUs). We formulate a novel hierarchical game theoretic framework to jointly optimize the transmit powers and subband allocations of the UUs and the pricing strategies of the MCO. In our framework, an overlapping coalition formation (OCF) game has been introduced to model the cooperative behaviors of the UUs. We then integrate this OCF game into a Stackelberg game-based hierarchical framework. We prove that the core of our proposed OCF game is nonempty and introduce an optimal subband-allocation scheme for UUs. A simple distributed algorithm is proposed for UUs to autonomously form an optimal coalition formation (CF) structure. The Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) of the proposed hierarchical game is derived, and its uniqueness and optimality are proved. A distributed joint optimization algorithm is also proposed to approach the SE of the game with limited information exchanges between the MCO and the UUs.
Toward Cooperation by Carrier Aggregation in
Heterogeneous Networks: A Hierarchical Game Approach utilization efficiency by reusing the existing frequency bands. Due to the scarcity of radio resources, it is important to develop an efficient method to improve the network capacity with limited radio resources. Femtocells are introduced to improve coverage of the cellular network and the quality of service (QoS) of indoor mobile subscribers. Each femtocell, which is controlled by a low-power femtocell base station (BS), provides mobile communication service to subscribers in the local coverage area. As the deployment of the femtocells can be made by the consumers, centralized control is generally difficult to achieve. Game theory provides useful tools to study distributed optimization problems for multiuser network systems. Various game theoretical models have been proposed to investigate spectrum sharing between femtocells and existing cellular network infrastructure [5] , [10] . In [10] , the distributed interference control problem is modeled as a noncooperative game and the impacts of different pricing schemes on the performance of the spectrum sharing network are discussed. By using the Stackelberg game model, a pricing-based approach to handle the interference control problem was proposed in [1] , where a subband pricing scheme is introduced to regulate the received power at the BS for codedivision multiple-access communication.
In this paper, we consider a special HetNet in which the spectrum licensed to a macrocell operator (MCO) can be shared by multiple co-located BSs. Each femtocell BS tries to make the best use of the spectrum offered by the MCO. The users subscribed to the service of the MCO are regarded as the licensed users (LUs) who have the priority to access the resources of the MCO. The users subscribed to the femtocell service are unlicensed users (UUs) and can only share the subbands owned by the MCO under the condition that the resulting interference to the LUs is maintained within a tolerable level. The subband allocation of each UU is controlled by the corresponding femtocell BS. Carrier aggregation (CA) is introduced in the LTE-A system to allow multiple frequency resources in different frequency bands to be aggregated to support wideband high-speed transmission [26] , [27] . We focus on the CA-enabled HetNets in which each femtocell BS can allocate multiple contiguous or noncontiguous subbands for each of its UUs. We assume that each subband can be accessed by multiple users at the same time. We formulate the subband-allocation problem as an overlapping coalition formation game (OCF game). In this game, a coalition is formed by the UUs who can access the same subband. Since each UU can access multiple subbands, 0018-9545 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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two or more coalitions may contain the same UU. In other words, the coalitions formed by UUs can be overlapped. The performance of each UU depends not only on the subbandallocation scheme but on its transmit power used to send signals in different coalitions as well. We integrate the formulated OCF game into a hierarchical game framework to investigate the interaction between the MCO and the UUs. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to apply the hierarchical game theoretic model to analyze the CA-enabled HetNets. It is known that allowing overlapping among multiple coalitions will significantly increase the complexity of the system. Specifically, finding a stable coalition formation (CF) structure of an OCF game is notoriously difficult, and it is generally impossible to exhaustively search all the possible structures. In this paper, we propose a distributed algorithm that can approach the structure that is in the core of our proposed game. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
1) A spectrum sharing-based HetNet is considered, in which the femtocell BS can aggregate multiple subbands of the MCO and allocate the aggregated subbands to support high-speed wideband data transmission for each UU. This is different from our previous work [22] , [24] , where each UU is assumed to only access one subband. 2) An OCF game model is applied to study the scenario that the cooperative UUs can dedicate their power resources in multiple subbands.
3) The nonemptiness of the core of our proposed OCF game is proved. 4) A hierarchical game framework is established to study the joint optimization of transmit power and subband allocation of UUs, as well as the pricing strategy of the MCO. 5) Numerical results are presented to analyze the impact of power constraint, the number of users, and the number of available subbands on the performance of HetNets. We show that the proposed algorithm can significantly improve the performance of the HetNets.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the related works. The system setup and problem formulation are introduced in Sections III and IV, respectively. A game theoretic model is established and analyzed in Section V, and a distributed algorithm is proposed in Section VI. Section VII presents the numerical results, and this paper is concluded in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORKS
An important problem in a spectrum sharing-based network is how to give sufficient protection to the LUs of the MCO. The interference power constraint [8] is usually applied to regulate spectrum sharing between UUs and LUs. In this case, the Stackelberg game can be a useful tool to model the interaction between the MCO and the UUs. In [1] and [10] , the MCO is the leader who has the priority to set a price to access and the UUs act as followers who will decide their best transmit powers based on the prices. These works show the usefulness of applying the Stackelberg game model in solving the interference control problem for systems with hierarchical structure. This also motivates our work to apply the Stackelberg game-based model to analyze the HetNets with hierarchical structure.
In our previous work [22] , we focus on the case that the spectrum owned by the MCO is divided into subbands to be shared with the UUs. A noncooperative game model enables the UUs to sequentially join the subbands, whereas the interference to the MCO is controlled by a pricing mechanism. The limitation of this solution is that the subband and UUs can only be one-to-one paired so that frequency reuse among UUs is not considered.
In the LTE-A standard, CA is proposed to support high data rate [6] , [9] , [19] . The CA technique is the process of aggregating different blocks of underutilized spectrum into larger transmission bandwidths to support high data rate [26] , [27] . The technical challenges of implementing CA have been discussed in [29] . In [15] and [16] , a cross-tier CA scheme is proposed in HetNets, in which the user equipment is assumed to access different tiers (i.e., BSs) of the HetNets and perform CA to improve its ergodic rate. However, coordination among different tiers is a challenging problem. In [11] , the optimal CA level of the service provider is investigated. A quality-driven scheme based on the Erlang-B blocking formula is developed to determine how much spectrum should be used for CA. In [30] , a heuristic algorithm based on a noncooperative game model is developed for this problem, which is reported to achieve the Nash equilibrium of the proposed game. This work, however, only considers noncooperative competition between UUs. In this paper, we propose a general hierarchical game theoretic framework that allows cooperation among UUs in a distributed manner.
Game theory-based resource allocation has been also used to study the coordination of the BSs on subcarrier selection and interference management [2] , [28] . In [28] , a BS cooperation policy is proposed for multiple closely located BSs to choose the proper subsets of subbands to aggregate in order to mitigate intercell interference. In [2] , analysis is given on the coexistence problem of macrocell BS (primary user) and femtocell BS (secondary user) from a cognitive radio point of view. A series of techniques such as adaptive power transmission and noncooperative and coalitional games is introduced to give the solution to interference management. However, in this paper, we consider the coordination between the UUs rather than between the BSs, which is a challenging task particularly in networks with a larger number of mobile UUs.
In [7] , the cooperation between cellular subscribers located at the edge of each cell is studied. It has been found that carefully constructing pairwise coalitions between the edge nodes by allowing some nodes to serve as the relays can significantly improve the overall network performance. In [13] , the rateallocation problem for Gaussian multiple-access channels was investigated. It was proved that it is possible to find a unique allocation, which always lies in the core of the game. In [24] , the authors investigated the cooperative behaviors of secondary users in a two-tier spectrum sharing cognitive network where both the Stackelberg game and the non-OCF game were combined to build a hierarchical game framework. A joint solution was given to the subband-allocation and interference control problem. Although the coalitional game has been widely used to study the problems in wireless communications, most of the existing works only allow users to form disjoint coalitions. In practical communication systems, allowing overlapping of coalitions can further improve the performance [25] . For example, one mobile subscriber may cooperatively transmit in two different subbands with two different subscribers. However, so far, only limited works have been reported to apply the overlapping coalitional game to analyze cellular networking systems. In [31] , investigation was made on how small-cell BSs coordinate with each other to achieve efficient transmission. By allowing the femtocells to form overlapping coalitions to jointly schedule the transmission of their subscribers, it was found that the performance of mobile nodes located at the edge of the coverage areas can be further improved. One of the key differences between the proposed work and the previously reported results is that we adopt a new OCF game model, which enables each player to join multiple coalitions.
III. SYSTEM SETUP
Consider an orthogonal frequency-division multiple-access (OFDMA)-based two-tier network where the spectrum owned by an MCO is divided into M subbands. Each of the subbands can be accessed by multiple UUs controlled by the femtocell BSs, as shown in Fig. 1 . We denote the set of subbands as B and the set of femtocell BSs as K. Here, the concept of underlay is borrowed from the cognitive radio, which means that each secondary user (i.e., UU) is allowed to access the spectrum of primary users (i.e., LUs) that can tolerate limited interference from the UUs [33] . In this paper, we consider frequencyselective fading, i.e., channel fading in different subbands is independent. We assume that the channel state is time invariant and can be regarded as a constant within each time slot. It is also assumed that the mobile devices are equipped with multiple antennas and hence can transmit over multiple subbands at the same time. Furthermore, multiple UUs are allowed to share the same subband with UUs. The system analysis is performed by using numerical calculations and the simulation on MATLAB platform.
Each femtocell BS can apply multiple subbands to support services for UUs, i.e., each subband can be accessed by the UUs from more than one femtocell BS. We assume that, in each time slot, there is only one active UU S k connected with femtocell BS k. Let h m k be the channel gain between S k and the macrocell BS receiver in subband m and g m kj be the channel gain between S k and jth femtocell BS. Let p S k = [p 1 S k , . . . , p m S k ] be the power-allocation vector of UUs, where p m S k = 0 implies that subband m is not used by S k . Table I lists the notations and symbols used in this paper. Multiple femtocell BSs can apply for the same subband at the same time. We denote the set of all UUs as S and the set of UUs utilizing the same subband m as L m , i.e., L m = {S k : p m S k > 0 ∀ S k ∈ S}. L m = ∅ means that no UU uses subband m, L m = {S k } means that subband m is exclusively occupied by UU S k , and |L m | ≥ 2 means that subband m has been shared by two or more UUs.
Different from the previous works, which consider the distributed spectrum sharing scheme [30] , UUs can cooperatively transmit the signal with cochannel peers to further improve their payoffs. In this paper, we follow the same line as [17] and assume that UUs from different femtocells sharing the same subband m can cooperate by forming a virtual |L m |-input-|L m |output multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) channel [17] .
In this paper, we consider the following two power constraints:
• The interference power constraint in each subband m
where the maximum tolerable interference Q is determined by the macrocell BS to protect the LUs. • The transmit power cap of the mobile devices
where p m S k is the transmit power of S k on subband m, and p is the total amount of power that can be used by each UU S k to transmit signals. The value ofp depends on the physical limits of the hardware and the battery life.
Remark: These two power constraints together limit the number of UUs that can be assigned in each subband. For example, if p and h m S k are large, UU S k may cause interference that is close to Q so that it will be the only active UU in subband m. If p and h m S k are small, multiple UUs can simultaneously access the same subband, and the accumulated interference is still below Q. The number of subbands used by an individual UU is affected by the power cap given in (2), but the total number of the active UUs in each subband is limited by the maximum tolerable interference level constraint in (1) .
The interference power constraint reflects the fact that the randomly distributed UUs usually give different levels of interference to each macrocell BS. Due to frequency-selective fading, the interferences from the same UU are generally different in different subbands. Hence, the UUs are preferred to transmit in those frequency bands with weak channel gains between the UUs and the macrocell BS.
An important problem is how UUs can distributively form different coalitions to improve their payoffs. We formulate an OCF game to study this problem. In this game, UUs can behave cooperatively to coordinate their actions. Hence, the CF game focuses on solving the following two questions: a) How do the coalition members coordinate with each other; and b) how can a CF structure be established among UUs?
To answer the first question, the virtual MIMO technique is used as the cooperation scheme among the UUs in the same coalition because it is shown to achieve the upper bound of the rate for a multiple-access channel [21] and to satisfy proportional fairness [24] . More specifically, the UUs in the same subband m form a coalition and cooperate with each other to transmit and receive signal. Using the virtual MIMO technique, we can convert communication within one coalition into a virtual L m -input-L m -output channel, which follows the same line as [24] and [21] . Therefore, the capacity sum of all UUs in the mth virtual MIMO channel is obtained as
where λ m S k is the kth nonzero eigenvalue of matrix
is the channel gain matrix of UUs in the same subband. For example, if {S 1 , . . . , S n } are in the same subband m, then the matrix is given by
In this matrix, g m jk = g m jk /σ m k , where g m jk is the channel gain between UU S j and femtocell BS k, and σ m k is the received interference power at BS k in subband m. Note that, as σ m k changes, the action of the UU adjusts adaptively; hence, the negative externality brought by the intercell interference is compensated. We will give detailed analysis and propose a distributive algorithm to answer the second question in Section V.
To simplify the analysis, let us consider the uplink transmission. In the uplink, the receiver of the macrocell BS is interfered by the transmit signals of UUs. Therefore, there is only one leader when it applies price-based interference control. However, our model can be directly extended to the downlink scenario. In the downlink case, multiple LUs act as a group of leaders that can cooperatively decide the interference price in each subband. The main objectives of this paper are to solve the following problems.
1) Power control problem: Investigate how the MCO controls the interference power to protect the LUs by dynamically adjusting the interference price. 2) Subband-allocation problem: Investigate how the UUs choose the subbands to access based on the channel information, the interference price, and the action of other UUs. 3) OCF problem: Investigate how the UUs form overlapping coalitions to improve their data rate.
A hierarchical game framework is formulated to jointly optimize the solutions to these three problems.
IV. HIERARCHICAL GAME FORMULATION
The interaction between the macrocell BS and femtocell BS can be modeled as a Stackelberg game. Furthermore, we also formulate an OCF game to investigate the cooperation among the femtocell BSs, where their UUs can form coalitions to improve the performance. It is assumed that the transmission of femtocell and macrocell is synchronized.
Let us jointly solve the power control problem of the LUs and the resource-allocation problem of the UUs. First, there is a tradeoff between the capacity sum of the femtocell network and the QoS of the macrocell. If the UUs transmit with high power, they will get high data rate but generate more interference to the macrocell BS. Since sufficient protection to the LUs should be guaranteed in the first place, the MCO should regulate the behavior of the UUs, which can be modeled as a power control problem for UUs. Second, given the limited spectrum and power resources, we should consider how the UUs can cooperate with each other to allocate the subband and optimize power consumption.
Let us consider a hierarchical game consisting of two subgames. In the proposed game model, the MCO and femtocell BSs are the players. The way the players play the game is defined as actions. The action of the MCO is to decide the interference prices, and the actions of the UUs are to decide which subbands to access and how much power should be allocated to each of these subbands.
The Stackelberg game is used to model the interaction between the MCO and the femtocell BSs. In the proposed Stackelberg game, the leader is the MCO and the corresponding LUs and the followers are the femtocell BSs who control the UUs. Let us follow a commonly adopted game theoretic setup [10] , [20] , [23] to define the payoff of S k as where
is the cost function. Furthermore, since S k can simultaneously access multiple subbands, it aims to maximize the sum of the payoffs obtained from all the active subbands under the constraints given in (1) and (2).
The MCO collects the payment from all the UUs occupying the subbands, and the payoff functions of the MCO are defined as
The main solution to our proposed hierarchical game is the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE), which is formally defined as follows [3] . 
where μ −m means all the MCO, except for m. For any given price μ, p * is given by
The structure of the hierarchical game is shown in Fig. 2 . The MCOs can adjust their prices to maximize the payoff defined in (6) . We will show that the optimal price is specified by the dynamics of the interference from the CA in each subband. The femtocell BSs can cooperate and self-organize into coalitions, each of which consists of member UUs to coordinate the transmission to improve the sum of the payoffs. On the femtocell BSs' side, they cooperate and self-organize into coalitions, in which their member UUs can coordinate their transmission to improve the sum of payoff.
A. Payoff of UUs
Suppose that the OCF structure is fixed and each S k has already obtained a fixed λ S k . We can write the payoff of each UU S k as
The optimal power allocation of S k is obtained by solving the following optimization problem.
Problem 1:
In the proposed Stackelberg game framework, the maximum tolerable interference in (1) is omitted in Problem 1 because it is included in the interference μ m and, thus, is always satisfied. Hence, we only need to consider the constraint in (2) . Problem 1 can be directly solved by using the standard convex optimization approaches, and the resulting optimal transmit power for UU S k in subband m is given by
Let
Due to the power cap constraint in (2), the final power allocation will fall into the following two cases.
In this case, S k can access all subbands under the constraint defined in (2) . The power allocation of S k is decided by the constraint in (1) . Hence, we can remove (2) , and the power allocation of the UU solely depends on the subband prices. Each of the UUs tries to solve (9) for optimal power allocation and obtain p m † S k to maximize the payoff.
Case 2: If M m=1 p m † S k >p: In this case, only selected subbands can be accessed by the UU S k . More specifically, the solution is achieved by searching a subset N i ⊂ M such that the following condition is satisfied:
where {N j } denotes the set of all possible subsets of M, except N i . This case implies that, once the price is fixed, the number of subbands accessed by one UU is bounded by the power cap constraint, and obviously, we have m∈N i p m † S k ≤ p. In either case, we can obtain the following optimal power allocation of S k :
The corresponding subband-allocation indicator is
From these results, it can be observed that the optimal solution to the transmit power only depends on the values of μ m and λ m S k . The prices are decided by the MCO through its interaction with UUs, and λ m S k is obtained from the CF structures of UUs. In the remainder of this section, we discuss how to obtain optimal μ m and λ m S k .
B. Payoff of the MCO
The MCO can use the prices μ charged to the UUs to control the interference in each subband. We will show that the MCO can maximize its payoff by adjusting the prices based on the dynamics of the aggregated interference at the macrocell BS receiver. Hence, the proposed algorithm greatly reduces the communication overhead and makes the distributed-powerallocation approach possible.
The revenue gained by the MCO by sharing subband m is given by
Hence, the MCO tries to find the optimal subband price to maximize its revenue in each subband under the maximum tolerable interference constraint.
Problem 2:
Substituting (11) into Problem 2, we obtain the following problem.
Problem 3:
Using a standard convex optimization approach to find the optimal μ m in this problem requires the MCO to obtain global information on the UUs. Fortunately, Problem 3 has a nice property that the objective and constraint functions both monotonically decrease with μ m . Hence, if we assume that the power cap constraint is satisfied, then the objective function will be maximized when the constraint in (20) takes equality. Note that the left side of (20) is the aggregated interference received by macrocell BS in subband m. Therefore, the MCO can optimize price μ m and affect the aggregated interferences to the upper bound.
V. COALITION FORMATION GAME ANALYSIS
Here, we first define the coalitional game and imputation and then analyze the game properties to prove the existence of the core. Definition 2 ([18] , Ch. 9): A coalition C is a nonempty subset of the set of all players K, i.e., C ⊆ K. A coalition of all players is referred as the grand coalition K. A coalitional game is defined as (C, v), where v is the value function mapping a coalition structure C to a real value v(C). A coalitional game is said to be superadditive if, for any two disjoint coalitions C 1 and C 2 where C 1 ∩ C 2 = ∅ and C 1 ,
Given two coalitions C 1 and C 2 , we state that C 1 and C 2 overlap if C 1 ∩ C 2 = ∅. Definition 3: A payoff vector π is a division of the value v(C) to all the coalition members, i.e., π = [π S 1 , . . . , π S K ]. We state that π is group rational if K k=1 π S k = v(C) and individual ra-
We define an imputation as a payoff vector satisfying both group and individual rationalities.
If a coalitional game satisfies the superadditive condition, all the players will have the incentive to form a grand coalition. However, if the superadditive condition does not hold, then the grand coalition will not be the optimal solution for all players. In this case, the players will try to form a stable CF structure in which no player can profitably deviate from it. In the proposed OCF game, for each possible price of the MCO, we focus on finding an optimal CF structure for UUs to share the spectrum of the MCO.
When overlapping is enabled among coalitions, the coalitions are no longer disjoint subsets of the player set as defined in the nonoverlapping coalitional game. In the OCF game, the concept partial coalition is utilized.
Definition 4: Partial coalition is defined as a vector p m = (p m S 1 , p m S 2 , . . . , p m S k ), where p m S k is the fractional resource of S k dedicated to coalition m. Note that p m S k = 0 means that S k is not a member of the mth coalition. A coalition structure is a collection P = (p 1 , . . . , p M ) of partial coalitions.
Remark 1: In a non-OCF game, a coalition is just a subset of the player set. For a player set of size N , the number of CF structures is given by the Bell number B N , where B N = N −1 k=0 N −1 k B k is the number of possible coalition structures and B k is the number of ways to partition the set into k items.
For example, for a game with two players S 1 and S 2 , the possible partitions can be written as {S 1 , S 2 } or {{S 1 }, {S 2 }}. However, in the OCF game, the concept of partial coalition not only specifies who joins each coalition but indicates how much resource each player will allocate to each coalition as well. If the resource is continuous, there are generally an infinite number of partial coalitions. It means that the concept of coalition can be regarded as a special case of the partial coalition, where each player joins only one coalition with all its resource.
Definition 5: An OCF game is denoted by G = (K, M, P , v) , where we have the following:
• K = {1, 2, . . . , K} is the set of players that are the femtocell BSs. • M = {1, 2, . . . , M} is the set of subbands.
• P is the power-allocation matrix, where the row its power on different subbands, and the column p m = (p m S 1 , p m S 2 , . . . , p m S K ) represents the power each player consumes for subband m. p m = (p m S 1 , p m S 2 , . . . , p m S K ) also corresponds to a partial coalition.
• v(C m ) : R n −→ R + is the value function, which represents the total payoff of a partial coalition C m .
Definition 6:
We define a game to be U-finite if, for any coalition structure that arises in this game, the number of all possible partial coalitions is bounded by U . Fig. 3 shows an example of the OCF of our model. Suppose that the spectrum of the MCO consists of six subbands {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6}, which can be allocated to three mobile devices {M 1, M2, M3}. A coalition is formed by two or more mobile devices accessing the same subband. Each mobile device may belong to multiple coalitions since it may access multiple subbands at the same time. The coalitions containing a common member player overlap. In Fig. 3 , for example, we denote the coalition formed by the devices accessing subband k as C k . We have
The sum rate achieved by forming coalition is given by (3), and the payoff sum of UUs is equal to the sum rate minus the payment to the MCO. Hence, the value function of the partial coalition p m is defined as the payoff sum on subband m. Given the fixed price vector μ, the value function of the partial coalition p m is given by
It is proved in [24] that the payoff division among coalition members satisfies the proportional fairness [12] , and if the benefit allocated to each member is equal to its contribution to the overall rate in subband m
The solution of the optimal power vector p m S k of S k is given by (13) , which is a function of λ m S k and μ m . Since μ is imposed by the MCO, the UUs can optimize their payoff sum by choosing proper subbands to access. Furthermore, since λ m S k is decided by the coalition structure, finding subband allocation will directly affect the payoff of each UU.
There are two types of actions in an OCF game, which are the coalitional action and the overlapping action. The former defines how the resources are being allocated among the member players in one coalition, and the latter defines how resources being allocated between players in the overlapping parts of multiple coalitions. These are the key features to differentiate the OCF game from the non-OCF game.
In the proposed system setup, the femtocell BSs whose UUs are accessing the same subband form a coalition. The cooperation among the member players is achieved by forming a virtual MIMO channel. The payoff division relies on assigning λ to the players, which can be considered as the contribution of each coalition member to the sum rate. Since the UUs can join multiple coalitions, the proposed game becomes an OCF game. The resource of a UU includes its total transmit power. The UUs need to allocate their transmit power in each subband properly for maximizing the payoff. For the proposed OCF game, we have the following definition.
Definition 7: For a set of UUs S, a coalition structure on S is a finite list of vectors (partial coalitions) P = (p 1 , . . . , p M ) that satisfies i) K k=1 h m S k p m S k ≤ Q; ii) sup p m ⊆ S for all m = 1, . . . , M; and iii) M m=1 p m S k ≤ p for all j ∈ S. The power-allocation matrix also indicates the utilization status of subbands. Constraint i) states that the transmit power of UU in each subband is bounded, ii) states that the overlapping coalition is a subset of the grand coalition, and iii) states that the sum of transmit power is upper bounded.
Proposition 1: The proposed OCF game is 2 K -finite. Proof: See Appendix A. This result suggests that it is possible to reduce the number of possible CF structures into a finite set.
We are interested in investigating a stable coalition structure that optimizes the payoff sum. Following the same line in [4] , let us define the core of the OCF game for the subband allocation.
Definition 8: For a set of players I ⊆ K, a tuple (P I , π I ) is in the core of an OCF game G = (K, v) . If for any other set of player J ⊆ K, any coalition structure P J on J , and any imputation y J , we have p j (C J , y J ) ≤ p i (C I , π I ) for some player j ∈ J.
Theorem 1: Given an OCF game G = (K, v) [4] , if v is continuously bounded, monotone, and U-finite for some U ∈ N, then an outcome (C S , π) is in the core of
where v * (S) is the least upper bound on the value that the members of S can achieve by forming the coalition. Proposition 2: The core of the proposed OCF game is nonempty.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Since enabling overlapping in the CF game will significantly increase the complexity of the game, the overlapping coalition structure is sometimes unstable as there may exist cycles in the game play. For example, let us consider a network system with three UUs S 1 , S 2 , and S 3 and two subbands l 1 and l 2 . We denote π S j [m|S i ] as the payoff obtained by S j when it forms coalition with S i on subband m, and π S j [m|∅] is the payoff obtained by S j when it exclusively occupies m. Initially, since 3 [l 1 |∅], S 1 joins l 1 , and S 2 and S 3 join l 2 . However, if we assume that the following statements hold for the three UUs:
, then we can easily observe that the game play of the CF will be stuck in a cycle. To avoid this situation, a history of the coalition structure is maintained in the proposed algorithm. If a rotation is detected, it will be removed from the CF flow.
VI. COORDINATION PROTOCOL DESIGN AND DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM
Here, we discuss the protocol design of the UUs' coordination and distributed algorithms, which can reach the coalition structure in the core of the CF game and the SE of the hierarchical game.
A. Protocol Design for Coordination of UUs
To implement the proposed algorithm into more practical systems, we consider the MAC protocol here. We have the following assumptions.
• We follow the same line as in [32] to introduce the following distributed coordination scheme among UUs. More specifically, the UUs accessing the same subbands perform in-band communication with each other. Because both control packets and data packets are transmitted in the same channel, there is no need for a dedicated control channel. • We follow the same line as in [14] and [24] and assume that the channel gain between each UU and femtocell BS is the same in both forward and backward directions. • The channel gain can be regarded as a constant within one time slot. Each time slot consists of the duration for control packet exchange and data packet transmission. Two control packets, namely, request-to-send (RTS) and clear-to-send (CTS), are used for UUs sharing the same subband to exchange their identity and establish coordination links with each other. Each control packet also contains the address information on the transmitter so that the UU can identify the source of the packet. Each UU can extract the channel gain information from its received control packet.
Step 1) The channel gain estimation and neighborhood discovery: a) First, the femtocell BSs broadcast the RTS packet to all the UUs for them to estimate the channel gain. b) Each UU can then utilize the control packets for the in-band neighbor discovery and channel gain information exchange. For example, UU S j sends g m jk and g m jj to UU S k in subband m. Upon receiving the information sent by S j , S k will then send back a CTS packet containing g m kj and g m kk to S j . Hence, S j knows that S k is also accessing subband m and the channel gain information.
Step 2) Coalition formation: a) After the channel estimation and neighbor discovery, the UUs need to calculate and negotiate the payoff division factor λ m k . Since the channel gain and neighborhood information are obtained in the previous step, each of the UUs can construct G S k ∈Lm and subsequently calculate λ m k . The assignment of λ m k to each UU S k could be random or follow some policies [24] . Here, we assign λ m k by following the rank of channel gains. Suppose that the payoff division vector λ m is sorted in an ascending order [λ m 1 , . . . , λ m K ]. The UU S k has already obtained the channel gain g m jj , j = 1, . . . , K in step 1. S k sorts the channel gain in an ascending order and finds the rank value r S k of g m kk . Then, it picks the r S k th element in λ m as its payoff factor, i.e., λ m k = λ m [r S k ]. b) Based on the payoff division factor λ m k and price μ m broadcasted by the MCO, the UUs estimate their payoffs and decide to accept or reject the current coalition structure. If all the UUs are satisfied, go to step 3. If at least one UU is not satisfied, it will propose a new subband allocation, which makes the current coalition structure invalid. Then, go to step 1b.
Step 3) Data transmission:
After a stable coalition structure (i.e., subband and power allocation) is obtained, each UU starts data transmission with the optimal power calculated from (13) . Note that the duration of data transmission should be less than the channel coherence time.
In each iteration, each of the UUs will negotiate with K − 1 other UUs in a single subband. Considering there are K UUs and M subbands, we can see that the time complexity is O((K − 1)KM ).
Let us consider the communication overhead of the proposed protocol in the worst case. If we assume that the size of the control packets in the proposed protocol is v bits, then the overhead for channel gain estimation and neighborhood discovery is at most [K + 2(K − 1)]v bits. For negotiation, at most, [(k − 1)KM ]v bits are sent in each iteration. Recalling that the coalition structure is proved to be 2 n -finite, searching the core requires, at most, 2 K − 1 iterations. Therefore, the communication overhead in the worst case is [(2 K − 1)(k − 1)KM + 3K − 2]v bits.
B. Distributed Algorithm
To reduce the number of iterations, we can use a similar way to that in [24] to drive the feasible region of the subband price μ j , which is given by μ j ∈ [0, μ]. Letting v be the upper bound of v S k and h be the lower bound of |h jk | 2 , then we have μ = v/h.
Algorithm 1 OCF Algorithm for Subband Allocation
Step 1) Sensing:
a) The UUs, after receiving the prices of available subbands from the MCO, sequentially send a short training message to estimate their payoff in all the subbands when the subbands are exclusively used by S k . b) Each S k broadcasts the subband combination l * S k that maximizes its payoff sum
Let R * = {l * S k : S k ∈ {1, . . . , K}}.
Step 2) Negotiation: a) All the active UUs need to negotiate with each other on each of the subbands in R * to obtain the possible payoff division factor λ m S k . b) After the negotiation process, S k solves problem (1) based on the new set of λ m S k and obtains a new subband allocation to maximize its payoff. Then, S k updates and broadcasts its optimal subbands allocation.
Step 2 is repeated until no UU wants to change its occupied subbands.
Algorithm 2 Distributed Interference Control Algorithm
Definitions: At iteration t, let
• μ m (t) be the pricing coefficient of subband m.
Step 1) Initialization:
• Set μ m ≥ μ, ∀ m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , M}.
• Set > 0 to be a small positive constant.
Step 2) Price Adjustment: a) At iteration t, MCO updates and broadcasts μ(t) = (1 − )μ(t − 1). b) Each S k senses the subbands and negotiates with other active UUs in the same subbands to determine the subband allocation l m * (t) and power allocation p m * (t). c) All active UUs repeat step 2b to update their optimal subbands, and the outcome is a coalition structure P m (t). d) The MCO monitors the aggregated interference in each subband. If N j > Q, the price adjustment in subband j stops. If N j ≤ Q, go to step 2a.
Step 3) Termination:
The algorithm ends with solution μ * = μ(t − 1), P * = P (t − 1) in which the element p m * S k (μ m * ) is given by (13) . Algorithms I and II are proposed to find the SE of the hierarchical game. For any given Q, p pair, and the channel gains, the algorithms achieve the SE that contains a stable overlapping coalition structure and optimized power allocation for each UU. We have the following proposition about the SE of the game.
Proposition 3: The price μ m always converges to a nonnegative value if a nonnegative power allocation for a given p and Q pair exists.
Proof: See Appendix C. From Propositions 2 and 3, we conclude that, for any given p and Q, the proposed algorithms will converge to the SE of the hierarchical game. The simulation results provided in Section VII support this claim.
Remark 2: The hierarchical game works as follows. At the beginning of iteration, the MCO broadcasts the price μ to all UUs in its coverage area. Each UU decides its optimal transmit power and subband based on the received pricing information sent by the MCO. Once all UUs have made the decisions, the MCO will adjust the price based on the interference before going to the next iteration.
The proposed algorithms can be implemented in a distributed manner. On the MCO side, it does not need any information from the UUs, e.g., the interfering link gain h m S k or corresponding transmit power p m S k . It simply measures the aggregated interference at its receiver in each channel and adjusts the price accordingly. On the UUs' side, with the channel price and the link gain information measured within a coalition, they can easily derive the potential payoff gained by joining different coalitions. Therefore, each of them can choose the coalition that maximizes its payoff to join.
Considering the time overhead for information exchange between the MCO and the UUs, there is a need for only one dedicated channel for the MCO to broadcast the interference prices. The implementation is shown in Fig. 4 . A time frame for data transmission can be divided into two phases, namely, the power control phase and the data transmission phase. The power control phase is divided into several time slots, which corresponds to an iteration in the proposed interference control algorithm. In each time slot, the MCO first measures the interference it is suffering and then adjusts the interference price in each subband. Upon receiving the interference prices, the UUs reallocate their power in each subband based on the prices and the measured mutual interference. After several iterations when the prices and power allocation are stable, each of the UUs uses its power allocation in the last time slot to perform data transmission. Supposing that the price and power allocation converge after L time slots, each time slot duration is τ , the data transmission time is t, and the time overhead of the proposed algorithm is given by t/(Kτ + t).
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Here, we investigate the performance of the proposed hierarchical game framework in the spectrum sharing-based femtocell network. To better illustrate how to apply the proposed algorithm to various network environments, we consider the network system under different sets of interference and power constraints, as well as different numbers of UUs K and available subband M combinations. Fig. 5 shows the convergence of interference in a network with eight subbands, i.e., p = 50 and Q = 2. It is noted that the prices in each subband converge at the similar speeds. This is because the prices of the MCO directly control subband allocation and the power allocation of UUs. Finally, the prices charged to different subbands are independent from each other, which coincides with the definition in (18) .
In Fig. 6 , the convergence rate of average prices for different Q values is provided. An interesting observation is that, under the same power cap constraint, the convergence speed in the case of large Q is generally much faster than the convergence speed in the case of small Q. This phenomenon can be explained as follows. With the increase in Q, each UU will allocate more power in each subband. Hence, under a fixed power cap constraint, each UU can access fewer subbands or, equivalently, join few coalitions. Hence, a large Q reduces the chance for UUs to join many coalitions, which results in reduced complexity for CF. Thus, the time cost on forming a stable coalition structure can be significantly reduced. Figs. 7 and 8 show the convergence rate of the subband prices and the payoffs of the MCO and UUs' network. The tested network contains 64 UUs and 128 subbands, with p = 100. Fig. 7 compares the payoffs of the MCO versus the interference and power constraints. Assuming that the channel coefficients are fixed, we increase one constraint while fixing the others. It is observed that, at the beginning of each time slot, the payoffs increase with the constraint before they become steady. The reason for this is that, initially, the interference constraint is much tighter, which becomes the main limitation of the transmit power. However, when the interference constraint becomes larger, the transmit power is then jointly limited by both interference and power cap constraints. Finally, when the interference constraint becomes very loose, the transmit power is limited by the power cap constraint; hence, the system performance becomes stable. Fig. 8 shows the choice of interference limit Q against the average price μ over all subbands. The average price μ generally reflects how much interference LUs can tolerate. It is observed that the price at Q = 10 is higher than the price at Q = 50. This shows that the price decreases with the value of Q. Because the smaller the value of Q means the rarer of the resource, the price is accordingly increased. More specifically, it is obvious that the larger the Q, the larger the possible transmit power of UU. Considering the optimal power solution p m * number of active UUs is always lower than the total number of UUs. The reason is that if the channel gains of some UUs are highly correlated, the low-payoff UUs will always be forced to leave the coalition. In Fig. 9 , it is observed that, in general, the larger Q, the more active UUs because larger Q enables more chances for the UU to transmit. Fig. 10 shows that the more available subbands, the more coalitions formed because the number of coalitions is limited by the number of available subbands when overlapping is enable. Figs. 11 and 12 show the average number of coalitions each UU joins and the average prices of subbands under different numbers of subbands. Fig. 11 shows that the UU tends to join multiple coalitions when the number of available subbands increases because, in this case, the players with lower payoff in a crowded coalition may be better off by joining a new coalition. Fig. 12 presents that the subband prices tend to decrease with the number of available subbands. When the UUs access multiple subbands, the aggregated interference in a single subband will be lower, which results in lower subband prices. Another observation is that the price at Q = 10 is higher than that at Q = 50 because the tolerated interference is low when Q is small. Therefore, the price is accordingly higher. Fig. 13 . Comparison between CF and OCF schemes. Fig. 13 compares state-of-the-art CF with the proposed overlapping coalition. It is directly shown that the improvement of data rate is achieved by enabling overlapping. When the power available for transmit is high, the UUs in the OCF scheme are benefited by exploring more chances to transmit on multiple subbands, whereas in the CF scheme, each of the UUs can only access a single subband.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The subband-allocation and power control issues in the CA-enabled HetNet have been studied in this paper. We have developed a hierarchical game framework to jointly solve the power-control and subband-allocation problems under the constraints of the maximum transmit power and maximum tolerable interference level. A Stackelberg game is established for the MCO to regulate the transmit powers of the UUs to give sufficient protection to the LUs while optimizing the payoff of the UUs. An OCF game is also applied to analyze the behavior of the UUs that can self-organize into overlapping coalitions. We have proposed a simple two-layer algorithm for the UUs to iteratively search for the optimal coalition structure and the power allocations under different prices imposed by the macrocell BS. It has been proved that the proposed algorithm can always converge to the SE of the hierarchical game. At the same time, the resulting transmit power and the subband allocation are stable and no players can further improve their payoff by unilaterally deviating from it by acting alone. Furthermore, by allowing overlapping in the CF among UUs, we have addressed the power-control and subband-allocation problems under 2-D constraints. The proposed framework can also be extended into more general network settings with multiple BSs to cooperatively share their subbands or the downlink communication that multiple LUs need to be protected.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Suppose that a partial coalition p m * = {p m * S k : k = 1, 2, . . . , K} is formed on subband m, in which the positive power p m * S k is given by (13), i.e., p m * = arg max p m π(p m ).
We define the support of p m * as supp(p m * ) = S k : p m * S k > 0, k = 1, 2, . . . , K m ,
which defines a coalition of UUs regardless of the resource distribution. Hence, for any other partial coalition p m with the support supp(p m * ), we have π(p m * ) ≥ π(p m ),
i.e., the partial coalition p m * blocks all other partial coalitions formed on subband m, which involves supp(p m * ). Therefore, we can say that the partial coalition p m * in our proposed game is one-to-one correspondent to the coalition {S k : p m * S k > 0, k = 1, 2, . . . , K} m formed on subband m. Since {S k } m ⊆ K, i.e., {S k } m is a subset of K, the number of all possible partial coalitions is equal to the number of subsets of K, which is given by
This concludes the proof.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2 1) Continuous. The value function in (22) is the difference between a log function and a linear function, which is obviously continuous. 2) Monotone. The interference power constraint in (1) limits the total transmit power allocated in subband m indirectly by pricing in the Stackelberg game. Hence, the power allocated by S k in subband m is bounded by p m * S k . Since the payoff function π(p m S k ) of S k is concave, then, for any π(p m S k ) ∈ [0, p m * S k ], we have π(p m S k ) ≤ π(p m * S k ). Therefore, for any p m and p m * such that p m S k ≤ p m * S k , we have v(p m ) ≤ v(p m * ), i.e., the value function is monotone.
3) Bounded. According to the proof in 2), the value function is bounded by v(p m * ), where p m * = (p m S 1 , p m S 2 , . . . , p m S K ) satisfies K k=1 h m S k p m S k = Q. 4) U-finite. The proof can be referred to Proposition 1. 5) Inequality. The equality of (24) is always taken in the proposed game since the value function is the summation of individual payoff of the member players.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
In the previous section, we proved that finding optimal pricing using μ m * = arg max μ m π MCO (p * , μ m ) is equivalent to solving
Hence, the payoff maximizing for MCO can be achieved by choosing the optimal price to control the interference approaching Q. In other words, the only two cases that the MCO will stop further increasing or decreasing prices are 1) K k=1 p m S k h m S k ≤ Q; and 2) μ m = 0. In other words, the price μ m can always converge to a fixed price.
